Physical Layer Security Enhancement for Satellite Communication among
  Similar Channels: Relay Selection and Power Allocation by Han, Shuai et al.
-1- 
 
 Physical Layer Security Enhancement for Satellite Communi-
cation among Similar Channels: Relay Selection and Power Al-
location 
Shuai Han, Xiangxue Tai 
Harbin Institute of Technology, China 
 
Abstract: 
Channels of satellite communication are 
usually modeled as Rician fading channels with 
very large Rician factor or Gaussian channels. 
Therefore, when a legitimate user is close to an 
eavesdropping user, the legitimate channel is 
approximately the same as the eavesdropping 
channel. The physical layer security technology 
of traditional terrestrial wireless communica-
tion mainly takes advantage of the difference 
between the legitimate channel and the eaves-
dropping channel; thus, it is not suitable for 
satellite communication. To implement secure 
communication in similar channels for satellite 
communications, a secure communication 
model based on collaboration of the interfer-
ence relay of the satellite physical layer is pro-
posed. Relay selection and power allocation are 
further studied to enhance the security perfor-
mance of the satellite communication system 
based on the model. The relay selection stand-
ard under known instantaneous channel state 
information (CSI) and statistical CSI conditions 
is theoretically derived, thereby accomplishing 
minimization of the probability of secrecy relay. 
In addition, the power allocation factor is opti-
mized based on minimization of the secrecy 
outage probability. Moreover, a power alloca-
tion method based on the statistical CSI is pre-
sented. The secrecy outage probability perfor-
mance of each relay selection criterion and 
power allocation scheme are analyzed via a 
simulation. 
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1 Introduction 
The security problems that accompany the 
wide-area openness of satellite communication 
are far more serious than those of terrestrial 
networks. With the development of quantum 
computing, the encryption of traditional infor-
mation layers faces the risk of being brute-force 
cracked. Nevertheless, the theory of physical 
layer security will become a powerful means of 
ensuring the security of satellite communica-
tions. 
To date, there has been extensive research 
regarding physical layer security technology. 
Beamforming is a basic technique for imple-
menting secure communication of the physical 
layer of the system and is applied extensively 
to achieve security in specific communication 
scenarios. Reference [1] analyzed the physical 
layer security of a mul-
ti-input-multi-output-transmitting beamforming 
system in the eavesdropping channel based on a 
maximum-ratio combining (MRC) receiver. 
Reference [2] presented a novel frequency di-
verse array (FDA) beamforming method. The 
highly correlated channels of legitimate and 
eavesdropping users are decorrelated via the 
frequency offset of the array antenna. Refer-
ence [3] proposed a new, location-based beam-
forming method with a focus on eavesdropping 
channels. Like the beamforming technique, the 
artificial noise technique can also effectively 
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enhance the secrecy performance of the system. 
The principal idea of the artificial noise tech-
nique is to incorporate appropriate pseu-
do-random noise into the transmitted signal to 
interfere with the eavesdropper, such that the 
signal-receiving quality of the eavesdropper is 
reduced, thereby enhancing the secrecy capa-
bility. With multiple available antennas from 
the transmitter, the information and artificial 
noise (AN) can be transmitted simultaneously 
[4][5]. S. Goel and R. Negi pioneered using AN 
methods to enhance the channel capacity [6]. 
Reference [7] proposed a new strategy based on 
ordinal eigenvalues of the Wishart matrix. The 
message is encoded in the s strongest charac-
teristic subchannels, and the AN signal is gen-
erated in the remaining space. The complex 
non-central Wishart distribution is applied to 
extend this strategy to the Rician channel. The 
performance of a multiple-input and multi-
ple-output (MIMO) communication system is 
simulated in a Rician fading environment to 
study the influence of the Rician factor on the 
security capacity. Reference [8] presents a 
transmission method that maximizes the secre-
cy outage probability in the case of mul-
ti-antenna transmission. The accuracy of the 
channel state information (CSI) corresponding 
to the eavesdropping channel affects the appli-
cation of physical layer security techniques. 
Different AN design methods are employed 
depending on whether the eavesdropping 
channel state is known. The design of direc-
tional isotropic AN is utilized in the case in 
which the CSI of the eavesdropper is unknown 
[9] [10]. In addition, the AN technique is often 
combined with beamforming to achieve physi-
cal layer security. In reference [11], an AN op-
timization method that assists and coordinates 
multiple cells in beamforming is studied for 
multi-user systems. All base stations of beam-
forming and AN vector are collectively opti-
mized to reduce the total transmitting power to 
the largest extent possible while simultaneously 
guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) for 
authorized users and avoiding interception of 
information by unauthorized users. The optimal 
AN-assisted beamforming method is also stud-
ied in reference [12]. Several existing results 
regarding single-antenna eavesdroppers are ex-
tended to multi-antenna eavesdroppers; the re-
sults proved that the traditional zero-space AN 
plan is indeed the best for any parameter of the 
system. Reference [13] proposed an optimized 
secure multi-antenna transmission method 
based on AN-assisted secure beamforming for 
the situation in which the feedback from a sin-
gle-antenna receiver is limited. Reference [14] 
designed an AN-assisted transmission strategy 
for a multiple-input single-output multi-antenna 
eavesdropper (MISOME). The transmission 
and AN covariance are collectively optimized 
owing to the maximization of the secure rate. 
The co-frequency co-time full-duplex technol-
ogy can be applied to transmit AN for the pur-
pose of interfering with the eavesdropping node 
and thereby enhance the secrecy performance 
of the system. The full-duplex technology con-
siders two primary scenarios for the physical 
layer security. (1) The legitimate receiving end 
has full duplex functionality; it receives the 
signals coming from the transmitting end while 
transmitting the AN to interfere with the eaves-
dropper. (2) In the wiretap model with relays, it 
deploys the full-duplex technology on the relay 
node. The relay node receives the signal while 
transmitting the interference signal to interfere 
the activity of the eavesdropper [15] [16]. 
The physical layer security technique for 
terrestrial wireless communication stated above 
utilizes the difference between legitimate and 
eavesdropping channels to achieve secure 
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communication. However, in satellite commu-
nications, because the altitude of satellite is 
much greater than that of a legitimate receiver, 
almost no blocking obstacles or reflection are 
present in the transmission. The power of the 
direct signal is much greater than that of a mul-
ti-path signal. Consequently, the channel is es-
sentially related to the transmission loss, which 
is determined by the distance. When a legiti-
mate user is close to an eavesdropping user, the 
distance between the legitimate and eavesdrop-
ping users is much less than the distances from 
the satellite to both legitimate and eavesdrop-
ping users, and it can almost be ignored. Hence, 
the CSI of the legitimate channel is approxi-
mately equal to the CSI of the eavesdropping 
channel. Therefore, physical layer techniques 
for traditional terrestrial wireless communica-
tion cannot be directly applied to the security of 
satellite communication.  
This paper presents research regarding the 
physical layer security in the case in which le-
gitimate and eavesdropping channels are ap-
proximately equal in satellite communication. 
The co-frequency co-time cooperative inter-
ference relay is incorporated to transmit AN 
interference signals that only affect the eaves-
dropping user by reducing the quality of the 
signal received while ensuring its quality for 
the legitimate user, thereby ensuring the secre-
cy capability of the system and achieving the 
security of the communication. To further im-
prove the secrecy performance of the system, 
physical layer security enhancement techniques, 
including relay selection and power allocation, 
are studied, with a focus on the circumstances 
detailed above. The relay selection mainly 
concerns optimal selection among the multiple 
relays that can be accessed by the satellite 
communication system such that the secrecy 
outage probability performance of the system is 
optimized. Power allocation mainly concerns 
the case in which the total transmitting power 
of the satellite and cooperative interference re-
lays is fixed. By making the most effective use 
of power allocation between the satellite and 
relay, the performance in terms of the secrecy 
outage probability is optimized. 
Notations: 
2 System models 
To resolve the physical layer security 
problem in the case of similar satellite commu-
nication channels, incorporation of a 
near-ground co-frequency co-time cooperative 
interference relay is considered. The 
near-ground co-frequency co-time cooperative 
interference relay transmits an interference 
signal that theoretically has no effect on the 
legitimate receiving end according to certain 
strategy. This approach significantly reduces 
the quality of the signal received by an eaves-
dropping receiver, while the signal quality re-
mains substantially unchanged for legitimate 
users, thereby ensuring the secrecy capability 
of the system and achieving the security of the 
system. 
Bob Eve 
Relay 1
Relay 2
 Relay M-1
Relay MRelay k
Alice
 Figure 1 Satellite-ground physical layer secure 
communication system model 
Figure 1 shows the satellite-ground physi-
cal layer secure communication system model. 
The model contains a satellite (Alice), a legiti-
mate receiver end (Bob), an eavesdropping re-
ceiver end (Eve), and M near-ground 
co-frequency co-time cooperative interference 
-4- 
 
relays  Relay 
M
k
k  with respect to the satellite. 
Assume that Bob is close to Eve. In actual sat-
ellite communications, the satellite-ground 
channel is a Rician fading channel with very 
large Rician factor. The relay is near the ground; 
thus, the channel relayed to the ground receiv-
ing end is modeled as a Rician and Rayleigh 
channel. Therefore, when Bob is near Eve, the 
channels from Alice to Bob and from Alice to 
Eve are approximately equal, whereas the 
channels relaying to Bob and Eve differ. When 
data are must be transmitted between the satel-
lite and Bob, a selection from the M accessible 
relays near Bob must be made according to a 
relay selection strategy, and the selected relay 
participates in the data transmission of the sat-
ellite communication system. Alice transmits a 
confidential data signal; the relay transmits an 
AN interference signal that is orthogonal to the 
channel between the relay and the legitimate 
receiving end. Both Bob and Eve can receive 
cooperative interference relays from Alice and 
the relay. Assume that the numbers of transmit-
ting antennas for the satellite and relay are Ns 
and Nr, respectively, the receiving antennas of 
Bob and Eve are single antennas, and the satel-
lite’s and relay’s transmitting powers are sP  
and rP , respectively. Then, in the case in which 
the relay selected by the satellite communica-
tion system that participates in data transmis-
sion is relay k, assuming the legitimate and 
eavesdropping receiving ends have the same 
gain, the signals received by Bob and Eve are 
 
, , ,
H H
d k s sd s r rd k z k dy P P n  h x h x   (1) 
 
, , ,
H H
e k s se s r re k z k ey P P n  h x h x   (2) 
respectively, in which 
,d ky  represents the sig-
nal received by Bob when the selected relay is 
relay k; 
,e ky  indicates the signal received by 
Eve when the selected relay is relay k; sdh  is 
the CSI vector from Alice to Bob, 1sN
sd
h ; 
seh  is the CSI vector from Alice to Eve, 
1sN
se
h ; ,rd kh  is the CSI vector between 
the relay and Bob, 
1
,
rN
rd k
h ; and 
,re kh  is 
the CSI vector from the relay to Eve, 
1
,
rN
re k
h . dn  is the complex additive 
Gaussian random noise at Bob’s end, 
2(0, )dd Nn C  , and en  is the complex addi-
tive Gaussian random noise of the eavesdrop-
ping node at Eve’s end, 2(0, )ee Nn C  . sx  
represents the confidential data signal trans-
mitted by Alice, 1sN
s
x , for which the 
power is 1. 
,z kx  indicates the AN interference 
signal transmitted to Eve by the cooperative 
interference relay k, which is the pseu-
do-random complex Gaussian noise orthogonal 
to the channel between relay k and Bob; that is, 
,z kx is located in the null space of channel ,rd kh , 
1
,
rN
z k
x , for which the power is equal to 1. 
,z kx  can be specifically expressed as 
 
,, rd kz k k
 hx G z   (3) 
in which 
,rd kh
G is the normalized orthogonal 
basis matrix of the null space for channel 
,rd kh , 
,
1r r
rd k
N N hG , that is, ,, 1 10rd k r
H
rd k N hh G . 
kz  is the pseudo-random complex Gaussian 
noise, 1rN
k
z .  
 According to Equations (1), (2), and (3), 
the ratios of signal to interference at Bob and 
Eve are 
,d k and ,e k , respectively: 
 
2
, 2
s sd
d k
d
P



h
  (4) 
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.
2
, 2
2
. rd k
s se
e k
H
r re k e
P
P




h
h
h G
  (5) 
Then, when the relay is relay k, the instantane-
ous secrecy capacity at Bob is 
, 2 , 2 ,[log (1 ) log (1 )]s k d k e kC  
      (6) 
In the case in which the Gaussian noise power 
is equal to 2 2 2
d e     at the locations of 
Bob and Eve, because 
2 2
sd seh h , 
2
0
rd
H
r reP hh G , so d e  ; therefore, 0sC  . 
This result indicates that the model can achieve 
secure communication. Additionally, in the case 
of a high signal-noise ratio, as ,s rP P  , 
d   and 
2
2
rd
se
d
H
re
 
h
h
h G
 ( /s rP P   is 
a finite value); thus, sC  . This result 
shows that the model can attain an instantane-
ous secrecy capacity that is arbitrarily large 
when the transmitting power from Alice is suf-
ficiently large. 
 
3 Relay selections 
When multiple relay nodes are present in 
the system, Equation (6) reveals that the selec-
tion of the relay node to participate in the data 
transmission will affect the secrecy perfor-
mance of the system; thus, relay selection is an 
important technique for the enhancement of 
system security. Therefore, this section will 
study how the relay selection affects the en-
hancement in the secrecy performance of the 
system. 
A. Relay selection based on instantaneous 
CSI 
The channel of satellite communication is 
a slowly fading channel. The secrecy outage 
probability (SOP) is an important indicator for 
the measurement of the secrecy performance of 
slowly fading channels. The lower the SOP is, 
the better the secrecy performance of the sys-
tem. Therefore, optimization of the relay selec-
tion based on minimization of the SOP is 
meaningful. 
The SOP is the probability that the instan-
taneous secrecy capacity is less than a certain 
threshold. The secret communication should be 
interrupted once the instantaneous secrecy ca-
pacity is below this threshold; otherwise, the 
communication will not be safe. Assume that 
the minimum rate of secure system transmis-
sion is 
sR  when the relay is relay k; then, the 
SOP at Bob’s end can be expressed as 
 , ,[ ]out k s k sP Pr C R    (7) 
where [ ]Pr  represents solving for the proba-
bility. 
 The selected relay should be the relay that 
minimizes the SOP of the system among the M 
relays. Therefore, the optimal relay k* can be 
expressed as 
 
*
,
1,2,...,
argmin out k
k M
k P

   (8) 
Substituting Equation (7) into Equation (8) 
yields 
 
*
,
1,2,...,
arg max s k
k M
k C

   (9) 
Equation (9) reveals that the optimal relay 
k* obtained based on minimization of the SOP 
is equivalent to the optimal relay k* determined 
based on maximization of the instantaneous 
secrecy capacity. 
Substituting Equations (4), (5) and (6) into 
Equation (9), the optimal relay k* can be ex-
pressed as 
 
.
2
*
2 2
1,2,...,
2
2 2
2
.
arg max[log (1 )
log (1 )]
rd k
s sd
k M d
s se
H
r re k e
P
k
P
P



 
 
h
h
h
h G
  (10) 
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Since sP , rP , 
2
sdh , 
2
seh , 
2
d  and 
2
e are not related to relay k, Equation (10) is 
equivalent to 
 
.
2
*
.
1,2,...,
arg max
rd k
H
re k
k M
k

 hh G   (11) 
According to Equation (11), it is evident 
that the optimal relay k* is determined by the 
instantaneous CSI of channels  . 1
M
re kh  and 
 . 1
M
rd kh . The optimal relay k* must be contin-
uously updated as the instantaneous CSI of 
channels  . 1
M
re kh and  . 1
M
rd kh changes. 
B. Relay selection based on the statistical 
CSI 
In part A, the optimal relay k* is deter-
mined based on the instantaneous CSI of the 
channels  . 1
M
re kh  and  . 1
M
re kh  from 
1{Relay }
Mk  to Bob and Eve. However, errors 
are present in channel estimation, and it is dif-
ficult for satellite communication systems to 
obtain accurate CSI for  . 1
M
re kh  and  . 1
M
re kh ; 
thus, satellite communication systems may not 
have the ability to attain instantaneous CSI. In 
addition, the instantaneous CSI for  . 1
M
re kh  
and  . 1
M
re kh changes continuously; therefore, 
relay selection must be performed continuously 
by the satellite communication system. This 
will increase the signaling overhead, and 
moreover, performing relay-handover access 
continuously will increase the delay of data 
transmission. To remedy the drawbacks of the 
relay selection method based on known instan-
taneous CSI presented in Part A while improv-
ing the actual realizability, the relay selection 
should be based on statistical CSI. 
According to the optimal statistical 
CSI-based relay selection standard, when the 
instantaneous CSI cannot be attained, the opti-
mization function can be modified to 
 
.
2
. .
2
. .
2
*
.
1,2,...,
1,2,...,
1,2,...,
argmax
= argmax1 ( )
arg min ( )
rd k
H
re k rd k
H
re k rd k
H
re k
k M
k M
k M
k Pr r
F r
F r



  
  


h
h
h
h G
h G
h G
  (12) 
The meaning of Equation (12) is to select the 
relay with the highest probability whose ran-
dom variable 
.
2
. rd k
H
re k hh G   （k=1,2，…，M）
is greater than any other relays with the same 
threshold values. 
 Assume that the channels of relay 
1{Relay }
Mk to eavesdropping and legitimate 
receivers are independent Rayleigh channels 
with the same distribution. Then, random vari-
ables 
2
.re kh and
2
.rd kh both obey 
2  distri-
butions that have the same number of degrees 
of freedom, 2 rN . Additionally, since ,rd khG is 
the normalized orthogonal basis matrix of the 
null space for channel 
,rd kh , ,
1r r
rd k
N N hG , 
the random variable 
.
2
. rd k
H
re k hh G  obeys the 
2  distribution that has 2 2rN   degrees of 
freedom. Because the number of degrees of 
freedom, 2 2rN  , is an even number, the cu-
mulative distribution function (CDF) of the 
random variable 
.
2
. rd k
H
re k hh G  
is 
2
,
2
. .
2
2
2
0 ,
1
1 0
( ) ! 2
0, 0
r
re k
H
re k rd k
mr
N
m re k
r
e r
F r m
r




  
        



hh G
，
(13) 
where 
2
,2
,
[ ]
2
re k
re k
r
E
N
 
h
. 
Differentiating the CDF of 
.
2
. rd k
H
re k hh G  
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with respect to 
2
,re k  gives the first derivative 
of 2
. .
( )
H
re k rd k
F r
hh G
 with respect to 
2
,re k , which 
can be expressed as 
2
2. .
1
2
2 2 2
, , ,
d ( )
1 1
= ,   >0
d ( 2)! 2
r
H
re k rd k k
Nr
re k re k r re k
F r
r
e r
N

  

  
     
hh G
(14) 
Equation (14) reveals that the first deriva-
tive of 2
. .
( )
H
re k rd k
F r
hh G
with respect to
2
,re k , 
2
. .
2
d ( )
d
H
re k rd k
k
F r

hh G
, is always less than 0. Thus, 
2
. .
( )
H
re k rd k
F r
hh G
 is a monotonically decreasing 
function with respect to 
2
,re k ; that is, the 
greater the value of 
2
,re k , the smaller the value 
of 2
. .
( )
H
re k rd k
F r
hh G
. Therefore, Equation (12) can 
be converted into 
 
* 2
,
1,2,...,
argmax re k
k M
k 

   (15) 
Substituting 
2
,2
,
[ ]
2
re k
re k
r
E
N
 
h
 
into Equa-
tion (15) gives the statistical CSI-based relay 
selection criterion as 
 
2*
,
1,2,...,
argmax re k
k M
k E

    
h   (16) 
Using Equation (16), the relay that has the 
maximum statistical CSI for the eavesdropper 
channel can be selected. 
 
4 Power allocation 
After determining the relay to be involved in 
the secure data transmission, the entire secure 
transmission path of the satellite communica-
tion system includes a satellite, a co-frequency 
co-time cooperative interference relay, an 
eavesdropper and a legitimate receiver. Then, 
the transmitting powers of the satellite and re-
lay contribute to the power overhead of the sat-
ellite communication system. Therefore, to 
minimize the energy consumption of the entire 
system, it is necessary to constrain the total 
transmitting power of the satellite and relay. 
When the total transmitting power of the satel-
lite and relay is determined, the transmitting 
power allocation between the satellite and relay 
may affect the secrecy performance of the sys-
tem. For this reason, this section will further 
study the transmitting power allocation be-
tween satellites and relays to enhance the se-
crecy performance of the system. 
Assume that the selected secure transmis-
sion participating relay is relay k, the total 
transmitting power constraint of the satellite 
and relay k is P, the transmitting power sP  
of 
Alice is P , and the transmitting power rP  
of relay k is (1 )P ; α is defined by the 
power allocation factor, which represents the 
ratio of the transmitting power from Alice to 
the total transmitting power of Alice and the 
relay, (0,1)  . Then, substituting sP P  
and (1 )rP P   into Equation (6) gives the 
instantaneous secrecy capacity of the system, 
which is expressed as 
 
,
2
, 2 2
2
2 2
2
,
log (1 )
log (1 )
(1 )
rd k
sd
s k
d
se
H
re k e
P
C
P
P




 
 
 
 
h
h
h
h G
  (17) 
A. Uniform power allocation 
The simplest power distribution is uniform 
power allocation. The physical layer security 
model of the satellite communication system, 
uniform power allocation between Alice and 
relay k, is studied. This means that the trans-
mitting powers of Alice and relay k are equal; 
the power allocation factor is then α=0.5. 
The advantages of uniform power alloca-
tion between Alice and relay k are no relevant 
channel information being needed for power 
allocation, less requirements for satellite com-
munication systems, and reduced signaling 
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overhead for Alice and Relay k. However, 
when applying uniform power allocation, the 
power allocation factor does not depend on CSI 
about the satellite communication system. 
Therefore, optimal results in terms of the se-
crecy performance of the system cannot be 
achieved. For the satellite communication sys-
tem to attain better secrecy performance, it is 
necessary to optimize the power allocation be-
tween Alice and relay k. 
B. Optimal power allocation 
The optimization of power allocation in 
this section is still based on minimization of the 
SOP. Therefore, the optimal power allocation 
factor α* should minimize the SOP. The opti-
mization problem can be expressed as 
 ,
min ( )
s.t .0 1
out kP 
 
  (18) 
where , ,( ) [ ( ) ]out k s k sP Pr C R   . Following 
the same logic as in section 3, maximization of 
instantaneous secrecy capacity yields the min-
imum SOP. Thus, the optimal power allocation 
factor α* is expressed as 
 ,
0 1
* arg max ( )s kC

 
 
   (19) 
Let
2
2
sd
sd
d
P



h
,
2
,
2
rd k
rd
d
P



h
,
2
2
se
se
e
P



h
, and
.
2
.
2
rd k
H
re k
re
e
P



hh G
; substi-
tuting Equation (17) into Equation (19), the op-
timal power allocation factor can be rewritten 
as 
 
*
2
0 1
0 1
1
arg max log ( )
1
(1 ) 1
1
arg max
1
(1 ) 1
sd
se
re
sd
se
re





 


 
 
 



 



 
  (20) 
Since
2 2
sd seh h  and 
2 2
d e  , sd se  . 
Therefore, Equation (20) is equivalent to 
 
0 1
* arg max ( )F

 
 
   (21) 
where 
2 ( ) 1
( )
( ) 1
sd re sd re sd re re
sd re re
F
        

   
     

  
. 
According to Equation (21), solving for 
the optimal power allocation factor α* corre-
sponds to determining the maximum value of 
function ( )F  . Thus, the maximization and 
minimization of ( )F   must be analyzed. 
Therefore, a differentiation analysis of ( )F  is 
conducted. The first derivative of ( )F   can 
be expressed as 
2
2
d ( )
d
[ ( )] 2 ( 1) ( 1)
[ (1 ) 1]
sd re sd re sd re re sd re re
sd re
F 

           
  
     

  
(22) 
The second derivative of ( )F   can be ex-
pressed as 
 
  2
2 3
2 1 1d ( )
d [ (1 ) 1]
sd re re sd
sd re
F    
   
  

  
  (23) 
Since 0sd  and 0re  , 
  2 1 1 0sd re re sd       . At the same time, 
because 0 1  , 0sd   and (1 ) re  . 
Hence, 3[ (1 ) 1] 0sd re     . It can be 
concluded that the second derivative of ( )F   
is less than zero. Thus, ( )F   is a concave 
function. Therefore, the maximum value of 
( )F   corresponds to the zero of the first de-
rivative of ( )F  . Let Equation (22) be equal 
to 0; then, the equation for the optimal solution 
is 
 
 
 
*
1 1 ( 1)
1 1 ( 1)
1
re re sd
re sd
sd re sd
re sd
  

 
  
 
   


   
 

  (24) 
Because * (0,1)  , the value range of 
Equation (24) needs to be determined. When 
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re sd  ,  1 1 ( 1) 0re re sd       and 
0re sd   ; thus, * 0  . At the same time, 
 1 1 ( 1) 0sd re sd       , so 
 1 1 ( 1)
0
sd re sd
re sd
  
 
   


; therefore, * 1  . 
Thus, when re sd  , *0 1  . When 
re sd  , 0re sd   , and 
thus,  1 1 ( 1) 0re re sd       . Conse-
quently, * 0  , and also 
 1 1 ( 1) 0sd re sd       , 
 1 1 ( 1)
0
sd re sd
re sd
  
 
   


, and * 1  . There-
fore, *0 1  , which corresponds to the 
constraints of the power allocation factor. 
Hence, Equation (24) is the final solution for 
the optimal power allocation factor. 
Substituting 
2 2/sd sd dP  h  and 
,
2
2
, /rd k
H
re re k eP  hh G  into Equation (24), the 
final equation of optimal power allocation fac-
tor α* can be obtained and is expressed as 
 
, ,
,
2 2 2
, ,2 2 2
*
2 2
,2
1 1 ( 1)
( )
rd k rd k
rd k
H H
re k re k sd
H
re k sd
P P P
P
  


 
    
 


h h
h
h G h G h
h G h
 
 (25) 
Equation (25) reveals that the optimal power 
allocation factor α* is related to the total trans-
mitting power constraints 
P,
2
sdh and ,
2
, rd k
H
re k hh G . Therefore, to conduct 
such optimal power allocation for the satellite 
communication system, the instantaneous CSI 
of channels sdh , ,rd kh and ,re kh  must be 
known.  
Therefore, when the satellite communica-
tion system performs power allocation accord-
ing to the transmitting power of Alice, α*P, and 
that of the relay, (1-α*)P, the minimum SOP of 
the system is obtained. 
C. Power allocation based on statistical CSI 
When the system performs optimal power 
allocation, the known instantaneous CSI is re-
quired. However, accurate channel estimation 
is also required for the satellite communication 
system to obtain the instantaneous CSI sdh , 
,re kh , and ,rd kh . This makes it difficult to im-
plement this method in actual practice; there 
may be circumstance in which the system is 
unable to attain the instantaneous CSI. Moreo-
ver, the instantaneous CSI sdh , ,re kh  and 
,rd kh  are constantly changing; thus, the system 
must update the power allocation factor con-
tinuously according to changes in the instanta-
neous CSI. However, updating the power allo-
cation factor increases the signaling overhead 
and the complexity for the system to perform 
power allocation. 
 Therefore, to compensate for the inade-
quacy of optimal power allocation and ensure 
the realizability of the method in actual practice, 
statistical CSI power allocation is investigated. 
The power allocation is performed based on the 
statistical CSI of the channel to determine the 
value of the power allocation factor. Therefore, 
when the statistical CSI of the channel is con-
stant, the power allocation factor remains un-
changed. Then, the SOP of the system only de-
pends on the distribution of channels sdh , 
,re kh  and ,rd kh . The statistical CSI-based pow-
er allocation is still intended to attain the opti-
mal performance in terms of the SOP as much 
as possible; therefore, the derivation of the SOP 
is first conducted. 
Substituting Equation (17) into Equation 
(7), the equation for the SOP can be expressed 
as 
)(2 1) 2 1
( ) [ ] 
2 )(1
)(2 1) 2 1
            + [
(1
,
(1 )
(1
(1 )
, ]
2 )(1
s s
s
s s
s
sd
re sd
sd
s
R R
out R
R
d
re sd
sd
R
R
P Pr
Pr

 
  

 
 






 
  
 
 
 
 
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(26) 
Expressing the above in integral form and 
simplifying, the SOP can be rewritten as 
0
( ) 1 ) 2 ) ( )( ( d
sd sd re
sd
sd sd
V
o sdut reF V p FP V         
 (27) 
in which ( )
sd sd
p  represents the probability 
density function (PDF) of sd , ( )sd sdF   
represents the CDF of the random variable 
sd , ( )re rep   represents the PDF of re
 , 
( )
re re
F   
represents the CDF of re , reV  and 
sdV represent the integral threshold, and 
2 1s
R
sdV


 . 
It can be observed from Equation (27) that 
the expression for the SOP is related to the 
PDFs and CDFs of the random variables 
sd and re . Thus, next, the PDFs and CDFs 
of sd  and re  are derived. 
Satellite-ground channel sdh is a Rician 
fading channel with very large Rician factor. 
Therefore, the random variable 
2
sdh obeys the 
non-central chi-square distribution that has 
number of degrees of freedom equal to 2 rN . 
Additionally, because 
2 2/sd sd dP  h , 
through derivation, the PDF and CDF of sd  
are  
2
2
2
1
22
12 2 2
2
2
1
( ) e ( ), 0
)
0 0
( 2
,
sd dsd
r
sd
r
sd
PsN
P ssd sd d
sd
sd d
s
d
N
sd sd sd
d
p
s
I
s PP
 

   
 

 
 


 
 


  (28) 
2
2
1 ( , ), 0
)
0, 0
(
sd
r
sd d
sd
s
sd
N
sd sdd
sd
s
F P
Q

 



 

 
 


  (29) 
in which 
2
2
( 1)
sd sd
sd
sd
K E
s
K
 
 

h
and 
2
2
2 ( 1)
sd
sd
r sd
E
N K

 
 

h
. sdK  is the Rician factor 
of the channel sdh ; since the channel is a Ri-
cian fading channel with very large Rician fac-
tor, the value of sdK  is relatively large. 
(1) When ,rd kh and ,re kh  
are independent Ray-
leigh channels with same distribution, 
.
2
. rd k
H
re k hh G
 
obeys the 
2
 distribution that 
has 2 2rN   degrees of freedom. Additionally, 
because 
,
2
2
, /rd k
H
re re k eP  hh G , the CDF of 
re  is the equation for the SOP, 
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
1
1 >0
( ) ! 2
0, 0
re e
r
re
re
m
N
P re e
re
re m re
re
e
F m P

 

 





  
      


 ，   (30) 
Substituting Equations (28), (29), and (30) 
into Equation (27), the expression for the SOP 
under the aforementioned conditions is 
 
1 2( ) 2out out outP P P     (31) 
where 
2
2
2
re
re
r
E
N

 
 
h
; 
1 2
2
( , )
r
sd
out N
s
sd d
d sd
V
P
s
P Q



 ;
2
2 2
2 2
1 2
2 22
12 2 220
2 2
2
0
2
1 1
( ) e ( ) d
2 ! 2
sd re e
r r
sd
sd re
r
sd d
m
sd sd d
sd
Ps VN N
V
P Psd re e
N
msd sd rd sd e
out P
s V
I e
Ps m P
P
 
 

   

 
  


 
  
 
   
(2) When ,rd kh and ,re kh  are independent 
Rayleigh channels with same distribution, 
.
2
. rd k
H
re k hh G  obeys the non-central 
2  distri-
bution with 2 2rN   degrees of freedom. Ad-
ditionally, because
,
2
2
, /rd k
H
re re k eP  hh G , the 
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CDF of re  is the expression for the SOP: 
1 2
2
1 ( , ) >0
( )
0, 0
r
re
re e
N re
re re re
re
s
P
Q
F
 


 



 


，
  (32) 
where 
2
, ,
2
,( 1)
re k re k
re
re k
K E
s
K
 
  

h
,
2
,
2
,2 ( 1)
re k
re
r re k
E
N K

 
  

h
, 
and ,re kK  
is the Rician factor of channel 
,re kh . 
Substituting Equations (28), (29), and (32) 
into Equation (27), the expression for the SOP 
under the aforementioned conditions is 
 1 3( ) 2out out outP P P     (33) 
where
2
2
2
21
22
3 1 12 2
2
2 220
1
( ) e ( ) ( , )d
2
sd
r
sd
sd
r
sd d
r
PsN
V
P sd sd re e
out N N
sd sd sd re re
sd sd d
sd
d
s s
P I Q
Ps P P
 
     
   
 
   . 
It can be observed from Equations (31) 
and (33) that regardless of whether the channel 
between the relay and the ground receiving end, 
,rd kh and ,re kh , is a Rayleigh channel or a Ri-
cian channel, the SOP expression is not of a 
closed form, which makes it difficult to solve 
for the optimal power distribution factor. 
However, because the channel between the sat-
ellite and the ground receiving end is a Rician 
fading channel with very lager Rician factor in 
practice, the Rician distribution approximates 
the Gaussian distribution when the Rician fac-
tor is very large; that is, a Rician channel is ap-
proximately a Gaussian channel. Therefore, to 
obtain a closed-form SOP expression for cal-
culation convenience, we directly assume 
Gaussian channels to approximate Rician fad-
ing channels sdh and seh in the process of the 
SOP expression derivation. 
Assume that the gains of the sdh  
and 
seh  
channels are equal to A, 
2
[ ]sdA E h ; 
then, the following expression for the instanta-
neous secrecy capacity can be obtained by sub-
stituting 
2
=sd Ah  
into Equation (17) and 
simplifying: 
,
2
, 2
2
2
,
1
( ) log ( )
1
(1 )
rd k
d
s k
H
re k e
PA
C
PA
P




 



 hh G
 (34) 
Substituting Equation (34) into Equation 
(7) and simplifying, the expression for the SOP 
is 
'
' '
'
'
' '
( 1)(2 1) 2 1
( ),
(1 2 )(1 )
2 1
( ) 1,
( 1)(2 1) 2 1
1 ( ),
(1 2 )(1 )
s s
re s
s
s s
re s
R R
R
R
out
R R
R
P A
F
P A P A
P
P A
P A
F
P A P A




 
 


 
   

  
 
 

   
 
  
 
 (35) 
where 
'
2
d
P
P

 . 
Substituting Equation (30) into Equation 
(35), the following approximate closed-form 
expression for the SOP of ,rd kh and ,re kh , when 
they are independent and identically distributed 
Rayleigh channels, can be obtained: 
'
' ' 2
'
' ' 2
( 1)(2 1) '2
2 (1 )(1 2 )
' ' 2 '
0
'
( 1)(2 1) '
2 (1 )(1 2 )
'
1 ( 1)(2 1) 2 1
1 ,
! 2 (1 )(1 2 )
2 1
( ) 1,
1 ( 1)(2 1)
! 2 (1 )
Rs
s sr
Rs
re
s
s
Rs
s
Rs
re
mP A R RN
P P A
R
m re
R
Re
out
P A R
P P A
P A
e
m P P A P A
P
P A
P A
e
m P

  

  


  
 


  
  

 

  
   
  
   

 
 


2
' 2 '
0
2 1
,
(1 2 )
sr
s
m
RN
R
m reP A P A

 









     
   

  (36) 
Substituting Equation (32) into Equation 
(35), the following approximate closed-form 
expression for the SOP of ,rd kh  
and ,re kh , 
when they are independent and identically dis-
tributed Rician channels, can be obtained: 
'
1 '' ' 2
'
'
1 '' ' 2
( 1)(2 1) 2 1
1 ( , ),
(1 2 )(1 )
2 1
( ) 1,
( 1)(2 1) 2 1
( , ),
(1 2 )(1 )
s s
r s
s
s s
r s
R R
re
N R
re re
R
Ri
out
R R
re
N R
re re
s P A
Q
P AP A P
P
P A
s P A
Q
P AP A P


   
 


   


   
 
  


 

   
 
  

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  (37) 
Based on Equations (36) and (37), directly 
approximating the Rician fading channels with 
very large Rician factor sdh and seh  
as 
Gaussian channels in the derivation, a 
closed-form expression for the SOP can be ob-
tained. Thus, as long as the statistical CSI of 
channels sdh and ,re kh is known, the SOP at 
location of Bob can be directly and rapidly 
calculated. Moreover, because the range of the 
power allocation factor α value, (0,1)  , is 
quite small, the traversal search method can be 
employed. It is thus possible to traverse the 
power allocation factor α according to a speci-
fied step size, calculate the SOP, and select the 
α value resulting in the minimum SOP as the 
final power allocation factor; the specific algo-
rithm is detailed in Table 1. 
Table 1 CSI-based power allocation factor optimiza-
tion algorithm flow 
Algorithm 1 CSI-based power allocation factor 
optimization algorithm flow 
Input: 
Traversing step size of α: ∆α 
Total emission power: P 
Bob and Eve receiving end noise power: 
2  
sdh and reh statistical CSI：
2
sdE
 
 
h , 
2
reE
 
 
h  
Rician factor of reh  (this parameter does not 
exist when reh is Rayleigh channel): reK   
Output: Power allocation factor α 
1. Calculate all traversal values of power allocation 
factor α. 
Quantify the possible values of α in the interval 
(0,1), and store as one-dimensional vector B 
1
( ) ,    1,..., 1i a i i
a
   

B  
2. Travers power allocation factor to calculate SOP. 
According to the closed form expression of the 
power allocation factor, calculate the SOP for 
power allocation factor being every element in B, 
and store as one-dimensional vector outP . 
Rayleigh channel reh : 
( ) ( ( ))Reout outi P iP B  
Rician channel reh : 
( ) ( ( ))Riout outi P iP B  
3. Obtain final power allocation factor α. 
1
1,..., 2
argmin ( )op out
i
a
i i
 

 P  
( )opi  B  
 
5 Numerical Results and Analysis 
A. Performance analysis of SOP for relay se-
lection 
An analysis of the relay antenna number 
Nr is shown in Figure 2, which shows the varia-
tion curve of the SOP of the two relay selec-
tions with respect to the satellite and relay sum 
transmission power constraint P when 
2,4,8rN  . Assume that the minimum rate of 
secure transmission of the system Rs is 2 
bit/s/Hz, s rN N , the noise power at the re-
ceiving end is normalized to 1, 2/P P  , and 
P is 5-15 dB. To conform to the actual situation 
of the satellite-ground channel, the channels 
between the satellite emitting end and ground 
receiving end, sdh  
and seh , are Rician fading 
channels with Rician factor 10sdK  . The 
channels between the relay and ground receiv-
ing ends, reh and rdh , are Rayleigh channels. 
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Figure 2 SOP variation curve with respect to the total 
power P in each relay plan when 2,4,8rN   
It can be observed from Figure 2 that 
when all other conditions are fixed, the SOP 
performance of the selected relay in the condi-
tion of known instantaneous CSI is far better 
than that in the condition of known statistical 
CSI. This result indicates that the relay selec-
tion achieved the enhancement of the SOP per-
formance. In addition, when all other condi-
tions are fixed, the higher the number rN , the 
better the SOP performance of the two relay 
selections. For example, for the relay selection 
under the condition of known instantaneous 
CSI in Figure 2, when 12dBP   and =2rN , 
the order of magnitude of the SOP is greater 
than 10-1; it is 10-1 when =8rN , and it is 10
-2 
when =8rN . Additionally, in Figure 2, the 
SOP of the relay selection based on the instan-
taneous CSI when =2rN  is far less than that 
based on the statistical CSI when =8rN . This 
result once again indicates that the SOP per-
formance of the selected relay under the condi-
tion of known instantaneous CSI is far better 
than that under the condition of known statisti-
cal CSI. 
Figure 3 shows the impact of the mini-
mum rate of secure transmission of the system 
Rs on the SOP performance of the relay selec-
tion; the figure shows the variation curve of the 
SOP of each relay selection with respect to the 
total power constraint P when 1,1.5,2sR  . The 
condition of 4s rN N   is assumed here, and 
the other simulation conditions are the same as 
in Figure 2. 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
P(dB)
S
O
P
 
 
Rs=1，with Instantaneous CSI
Rs=1.5，with Instantaneous CSI
Rs=2，with Instantaneous CSI
Rs=1，with Statistics CSI
Rs=1.5，with Statistics CSI
Rs=2，with Statistics CSI
 
Figure 3 Variation curve of the SOP of each relay se-
lection with respect to the total power constraint P 
when 1,1.5,2sR   
It can also be observed from Figure 3 that 
the SOP performance of the selected relay with 
known instantaneous CSI is far better than that 
with known statistical CSI. In addition, as Rs 
decreases, the SOP performances of both relay 
selections improve, but the improvement in the 
relay selection with known instantaneous CSI 
is superior to that with known statistical CSI. 
For instance, in Figure 3, when 11dBP   and 
Rs decreased from 2 to 1.5 bit/s/Hz, the order of 
magnitude of the SOP of the relay selection 
with known instantaneous CSI decreased from 
10-1 to 10-3, whereas that of relay selection with 
known statistical CSI did not change. 
B. Relevant statistical analysis based on power 
allocation using statistical CSI 
The SOP of the statistical CSI-based pow-
er allocation is affected by the traversal step 
size used to determine the power allocation 
factor and the value of the Rician factor of the 
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actual satellite-to-ground receiving end channel. 
Therefore, the impact of the two on the SOP of 
the statistical CSI-based power allocation is 
analyzed via a simulation. 
Figure 4 shows the analysis of the influ-
ence of the Rician factor sdK  
of the actual 
satellite-ground channel sdh  
on the SOP per-
formance of the statistical CSI-based power 
allocation; it shows the variation curves of the 
SOP of each power allocation method with re-
spect to the Rician factor sdK  
of the chan-
nel sdh . Assume that the system’s minimum 
secure transmission rate Rs is 1 
bit/s/Hz, 4d rN N  , the receiving end noise 
power is normalized to 1, 2/P P  , 10P   
dB, and when the channel between the relay 
and the ground receiving end is a Rician chan-
nel, the Rician factor reK is 1. Then, 
2 2
[ ] [ ] 1sd reE E h h . It can be observed 
from Figure 4 that regardless of whether the 
channel between the relay and the ground re-
ceiving end is a Rician or Rayleigh channel, for 
higher sdK , the SOP performance of the statis-
tical CSI-based method is closer to the optimal 
SOP performance. When sdK  
is relatively 
small, the SOP of the statistical CSI-based 
power allocation method is quite different from 
the optimal one and even worse than the SOP 
performance of the uniform allocation method. 
For example, in Figure 4, when the channel 
between the relay and ground receiving end is a 
Rayleigh channel and 2sdK  , the SOP of the 
statistical CSI-based power allocation method 
is greater than the SOP of the uniform alloca-
tion method, whereas when 12sdK  , the SOP 
of the statistical CSI-based power allocation 
method is almost equal to that of optimal power 
allocation. This result occurred because we 
treated channel sdh  
as a Gaussian channel 
rather than the actual Rician fading channel 
with large Rician factor for approximate opti-
mization in the statistical CSI-based power al-
location approach. Therefore, the closer the ac-
tual channel sdh  is to a Gaussian channel, the 
closer the statistical CSI based power allocation 
is to the optimal solution; the larger the Rician 
factor of a Rician channel, the closer the chan-
nel is to a Gaussian channel. In reality, the Ri-
cian factor of the channel between the satellite 
and ground receiving end is quite large; there-
fore, the statistical CSI-based power allocation 
method is feasible. 
In addition, when the Rician factor sdK  
of the satellite-ground channel sdh  
is rela-
tively small, the SOP of the statistical 
CSI-based power allocation method is closer to 
the SOP of the optimal power allocation when 
the channel between the relay and the ground 
receiving end is a Rician channel, compared to 
when the channel is a Rayleigh channel. Addi-
tionally, when the other conditions are fixed, 
the SOP performance of the relay-to-ground 
receiving end channel is better when it is a Ri-
cian channel than when it is a Rayleigh chan-
nel. 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
10
-1
10
0
Ksd
S
O
P
 
 
Rayleigh，Optimal
Rayleigh，Uniform
Rayleigh，Based on Statistics CSI
Rician，Optimal
Rician，Uniform
Rician，Based on Statistics CSI
Rs=1bit/s/Hz
P=10dB
Rayleigh
Rician
 
Figure 4 Variation curve of the SOP of the power al-
location method with respect to the Rician factor 
sdK  
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of channel 
sdh  
Figure 5 analyzes the effect of the tra-
versal step size on the SOP performance of the 
statistical CSI-based power allocation method; 
it shows the statistical CSI-based power alloca-
tion scheme curve whose SOP varies with the 
total power constraint P in the cases in which 
the relay-ground receiving end channel is a Ri-
cian and a Rayleigh channel 
( 0.001,0.005,0.01,0.05,0.1a  ). Assume that 
the minimum rate of the system secure trans-
mission Rs is 1 bit/s/Hz, = = 4s rN N , the 
noise power of the receiving end is normalized 
to 1, 
2/P P  , P is in the range of 5 to 15 
dB, and the satellite-legitimate user channel 
and satellite-ground receiving end channel are 
both Rician channels with Rician factors sdK  
of 10. When the relay-ground receiving end 
channel is Rician, its Rician factor ,re kK  
is 1. 
Then, 
2 2
[ ] [ ] 1sd reE E h h . 
Figure 5 reveals that regardless of whether 
the relay-ground receiving end channel is Ri-
cian or Rayleigh, 
for 0.001,0.005,0.01,0.05,0.1a  , the per-
formance gap in terms of the SOP is small for 
the statistical CSI-based power allocation 
method. For 0.1a  , i.e., high signal-noise 
ratio, the SOP is slightly greater than the other 
four, and the other four curves almost coincide. 
From this result, it can be noted that the tra-
versal-step-length precision of power allocation 
factor reaching 0.05 can approximately obtain 
the optimal SOP. Since the value range of the 
power allocation factor α is (0,1)  , with a 
traversal step size of 0.05, only 19 traversals 
must be conducted. Meanwhile, the SOP has a 
closed-form expression that can be directly 
calculated. Therefore, the computational com-
plexity of the statistical CSI-based power allo-
cation method is achievable by the system. 
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Figure 5 Variation curve of the statistical CSI-based 
power allocation SOP with respect to the total power 
constraint P 
C. Comparison and analysis of each power al-
location scheme in terms of the SOP perfor-
mance 
To perform a better comparison of the se-
crecy performance for each power allocation, 
the SOP of each power allocation is simulated 
and analyzed. At the same time, the influence 
of the number of relay antennas rN  and the 
minimum rate of system secure transmission 
sR  on the performance of the SOP are ana-
lyzed via simulations. 
Figure 6 analyzes the effect of the number 
of relay antennas rN  on the SOP for each 
power allocation; it shows the variation curve 
of the SOP of each power allocation method 
with respect to the total power constraint P 
when 2,4,8rN  . Assume that the minimum 
rate of secure transmission Rs is 1 bit/s/Hz, 
s rN N , the noise power of the receiving end 
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is normalized to 1, 
2/P P  , and the total 
transmission power constraint P is in the range 
from 5 to 20 db. To correspond with the actual 
situation of the satellite-ground channel, the 
channel of satellite-transmitting end to the 
ground-receiving end is a Rician fading chan-
nel with Rician factor 5sdK  . Figure 6 a) 
shows the situation in which the re-
lay-to-ground receiving end channel is a Rician 
channel, whereas Figure 6 b) shows the situa-
tion in which the channel is a Rayleigh channel 
with Rayleigh factor , 1re kK  . 
It can be noted from Figure 6 that regardless of 
whether the relay-to-ground receiving end 
channel is a Rician or Rayleigh channel, when 
the other conditions are fixed, the performance 
optimal power allocation SOP is the best. The 
performance of statistical CSI-based SOP is 
second, but it is very close to that of the opti-
mal power allocation SOP. In addition, the SOP 
performance of the two power allocations is far 
superior to that of uniform power allocation, 
which indicates that the two proposed power 
allocation methods enhanced the performance 
in terms of the system SOP. When the other 
conditions are fixed, greater rN  corresponds 
to smaller SOP values for each power alloca-
tion method and thus better performance. For 
example, in Figure 6 a), at 15dBP   and 
=2rN , the order of magnitude of the SOP is 
-110 . When =4rN , the order of magnitude is 
-210 , and at =8rN , the order of magnitude is 
less than or equal to 
-510 .  
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a) Situation of relay to the ground when the receiving 
end channel is a Rayleigh channel 
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b) Situation of relay to the ground when the receiving 
end channel is a Rician channel 
Figure 6 Variation curve of the SOP of each power 
allocation method with respect to the total power con-
straint P when 2,4,8rN   
Figure 7 analyzes the effect of the mini-
mum security transmission rate Rs on the per-
formance of the power allocation SOP and 
shows the variation curve of power allocation 
of each method with respect to the total power 
constraint P. It is assumed that =4s rN N , 
and the other conditions are the same as those 
in Figure 6. 
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a) Situation of relay to the ground when the receiving 
end channel is a Rayleigh channel 
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b) Situation of relay to the ground when the receiving 
end channel is a Rician channel 
Figure 7 Variation curve of the SOP for each power 
allocation method with respect to the total power con-
straint P when 1,1.5,2sR   
It can be noted from the curves in Figure 7 
that regardless of whether the relay-to-ground 
receiving end channel is a Rician or Rayleigh 
channel, the smaller the value of sR , the smaller 
the SOP. For example, in Figure 7 b), when 
P=15 dB and 1sR  , the order of magnitude 
for SOP is 
210 . At 1.5sR  , the SOP order of 
magnitude is 
110 , and at 2sR  , the SOP or-
der of magnitude is greater than 
110 . Taking 
the derivative of Equation (7) yields  
 
   
 
, , 1
, 2 2 , 1
, 2 1 2
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The above yields the same result as the simula-
tion. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper studied secure physical layer 
communication in satellite communication via 
similar channels. A satellite-ground physical 
layer security communication model based on 
cooperative interference relay is proposed, and 
its feasibility is theoretically analyzed. The op-
timization of the relay selection standard is 
conducted on the basis of the model for the 
purpose of improving the performance of the 
system SOP. This approach specifically in-
cludes the relay selection criteria for conditions 
of known instantaneous CSI and known statis-
tical CSI. Additionally, based on the model, 
when the total transmitting power of the satel-
lite and relay is fixed, the power allocation be-
tween the satellite and the relay is optimized, 
which gives the optimal power allocation that 
minimizes the SOP. Additionally, a statistical 
CSI-based power allocation that considers re-
alizability was proposed. The simulation results 
indicate that the performance of the SOP ob-
tained with the known instantaneous CSI relay 
selection method exceeds that based on the 
known statistical CSI. Nevertheless, power al-
location based on the statistical CSI is achieva-
ble despite its complexity. In addition, the per-
formance of the optimal power allocation SOP 
is superior to that of statistical CSI-based pow-
er allocation, and the performance of statistical 
CSI-based power allocation is better than that 
of uniform power allocation. 
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